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THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
In response to Mr. Becker1 s contention that the inadequate 
voir dire requires a new trial, the State first contends that 
because Mr. Becker is relying on inferences of bias, and does not 
allege actual bias on the part of any juror, his claim fails under 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 910 
(1995), which states on page 398, "To prevail on a claim of error 
based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must 
demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was 
partial or incompetent.11 State's brief at 12-13. 
Contrary to the State' s implicit argument, Menzies does not 
overrule the law requiring trial courts to rebut inferences of 
juror bias during voir dire or remove the tainted jurors, such as 
that set forth in State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), 
1 
cert, deniedf 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Menzies overrules the law 
which required new trials if a defendant used a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror after a trial court erroneously denied 
a challenge for cause, such as Crawford v. Manningf 542 P.2d 1091 
(Utah 1975). This is clear from reading the State's quotation of 
Menzies in context: 
The State, on the other hand, asks us to overturn 
the Crawford line of cases and follow the approach 
utilized by a majority of the states and upheld by the 
federal courts. Those following the majority approach 
"reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory 
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional 
right to an impartial jury." Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). "So 
long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that 
the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to 
achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was 
violated." Id. (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 
7 S.Ct. 614, 616, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887)). To prevail on a 
claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for 
cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show 
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent. 
See id., 487 U.S. at 89, 108 S.Ct. at 2278. We agree 
with the State and overrule Crawford and its progeny. 
Menzies at 398. 
In any event, Mr. Becker has demonstrated that " a member of 
the jury was partial or incompetent," for Utah case law establishes 
that when jurors are tainted with an inference of bias, they are 
considered incompetent. For instance, in State v. Brooksf 563 P.2d 
799 (Utah 1977), the court stated, 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, in mandatory 
terms, guarantees the accused in a criminal proceeding 
the right to a trial by an impartial jury. To comply 
with this command, the legislature enacted Chapt. 30, 
Title 77, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. To effect 
the purpose of a trial by an impartial jury, the 
legislature provided the accused with the right to 
challenge a juror for actual bias. Section 77-30-18(2), 
defines /actual bias7 as 'the existence of a state of 
2 
mind on the part of the juror which leads to a just 
inference in reference to the case that he will not act 
with entire impartiality.' (Emphasis supplied.)t1] 
'Impartiality' is not a technical conception but is 
a state of mind? it is a mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference. 
A jury, in its role as a fact finder, must weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
A juror, who through a personal association with a 
witness or party has developed a relationship of 
affection, respect, or esteem, cannot be deemed 
disinterested, indifferent, impartial. 
This point is illustrated in State v. Jackson, 
wherein a prospective juror was challenged for cause. He 
had been a neighbor and friend and gone to church with 
several officers in the police department. In 
particular, he had been a close friend with Detective 
Lynes. Nevertheless, the prospective juror stated that 
if Detective Lynes contradicted the testimony of another 
witness he would not, because of his friendship, incline 
towards giving credence to his testimony. The trial 
court refused to excuse the prospective juror for cause, 
and defendant urged, on appeal, the ruling constituted 
prejudicial error. The court acknowledged the trial 
court is vested with broad discretionary powers in 
determining the qualifications of jurors, and its 
exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
. . . Nevertheless, we are satisfied that, under 
the particular circumstances here, the refusal to excuse 
Mr. Carolan constituted error which impaired the right of 
the defendants to competent and impartial jurors. His 
close relationship with members of the Elizabeth police 
department, particularly Detective Lynes, suggests 
inability to deal with the evidence with the measure of 
impartiality required by the law. It must be borne in 
mind that Detective Lynes was an important State's 
1
 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(4) is the current 
provision governing this type of challenge. Like its forebear in 
Brooks, the rule does not speak in terms of actual bias, but in 
terms of inference of bias. It provides that a challenge for 
cause lies when 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective 
juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. . . . 
3 
witness whose credibility was under direct attack. 
Though Mr. Carolan may have been wholly sincere in his 
statement that his long and close friendship with 
Detective Lynes would have no bearing whatever on the 
issue of credibility, we find it difficult to accept for 
it runs counter to human nature. . . . 
A juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence 
of his friend against the evidence of strangers and of 
the defendant so as to strike a balance between them as 
the law requires, viz., stand indifferent between the 
state and the accused. Where there have been personal 
associations, such as the ones here; to remain 
uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced; runs counter to 
human nature. One cannot be deemed indifferent or 
impartial. 
Brooks at 801-802 (court1 s footnotes omitted; footnote in brackets 
added by Mr. Becker). 
Specifically in response to Mr. Becker' s contention that a new 
trial is required by the service of Juror Connor, who had hired the 
prosecutor to perform legal work on his grandmother' s estate three 
months prior to the trial, the State argues that Mr. Becker's 
failure to remove juror Connor with a peremptory challenge should 
constitute a waiver of his claim regarding Mr. Connor' s partiality. 
State's brief at 13 n.2. The State recognizes that this Court 
rejected a similar argument in State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
App. 1995), but seeks to distinguish Baker on the ground that Baker 
involved a juror who was actually biased. State' s brief at 13 n.2. 
The Baker rule and its underlying analysis are not limited to 
cases involving actual bias. Because Mr. Becker exhausted his 
peremptory challenges and a tainted juror remained, he is entitled 
to reversal under Baker. 884 P.2d at 1287. 
On the merits, the State argues that the trial court did not 
abuse his discretion because the prosecutor represented Connor' s 
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grandmother1 s estate, rather than Mr. Connor. State1 s brief at 15. 
The factual accuracy of this assertion is questionable, inasmuch as 
the grandmother1 s estate was being probated on the East coast, and 
the prosecutor was hired by Mr. Connor and his brother to write a 
letter to an attorney who was apparently involved in the probate 
case. State* s brief at 15. Regardless of who the prosecutor was 
technically representing, Mr. Connor' s hiring of the prosecutor to 
perform legal services three months prior to the trial in this case 
reflects confidence, respect and trust in the prosecutor, which 
raised an inference of bias. Cox. 
Contrary to the State' s position, the questions posed by the 
trial court did not rebut an inference of bias, but simply asked 
the juror to assess his own partiality (T. 72-73). Utah law has 
long recognized that when the voir dire raises an inference of 
bias, the trial court must himself inquire to rebut the inference, 
and may not simply ask the juror to assess his own qualification to 
serve. Seg e.g. State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), 
cert, deniedf 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)(when prospective juror has 
been a victim of a crime similar to that at issue in the case, an 
inference of bias arises, which is not rebutted by a juror's claim 
that he can be fair and impartial). 
In seeking to diminish the significance of Mr. Connor* s choice 
of the prosecutor as an attorney three months prior to this trial, 
the State cites State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983)(per 
curiam). State's brief at 16. Lacey involved a juror who was 
acquainted with two witnesses in the case, and turned on the fact 
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that the witnesses were not challenged by the defense, and provided 
unimportant testimony. See Lacey at 1312 (• Although it might have 
been better to have excused Orme for cause, we find no error in 
leaving him on the panel. This is particularly so when the nature 
of the testimony offered by Carlquist and Adams is considered. 
Their credibility was not questioned and their testimony was not 
crucial to the prosecution's case/ )(footnotes omitted). 
In contrast, the relationship between the challenged juror 
Connor was between him and the State' s attorney, the leader and 
advocate of the entire prosecution against Mr. Becker. See Cox 
(addressing law specific to juror relationships with parties' 
attorneys). The trial court did not ask juror Connor his opinion 
of the prosecutor, whether he was pleased or dissatisfied with the 
prosecutor1 s work for him, or any other questions meaningfully 
addressing Mr. Connor1 s attitude toward the prosecutor. Under 
State v. CoxP 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), Mr. Becker is entitled 
to a new trial. 
In addressing the service of juror Newell, the juror who had 
known the prosecutor, Trooper Mangelson and another police officer 
witness since they had been in high school, and conceded that he 
had "a pretty good regard" for them, the State would like this 
Court to believe that juror Newell "was acquainted with Mr. Eyre 
and Sergeant Mangelson only when they were high school students, 
without any subsequent relationship," State's brief at 20. The 
record actually demonstrates that their relationships were ongoing 
not only as a result of Mr. Newell' s service as their high school 
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principal, but also as a result of his membership in their 
community (T. 75-76)• The transcript pages containing Mr. Newell' s 
voir dire on this point are in Appendix 1 to this brief. 
In seeking to justify juror Newell' s service, the States cites 
State v. Cobbr 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989); State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 
22 (Utah 1984); and State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App.), cert. 
deniedf 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). In contrast to the record in the 
instant case demonstrating an ongoing relationship, the records in 
Cobb and Hewitt demonstrated that relationships at issue there 
began and ended in high school fifteen and twenty years before the 
trials in those cases, and did not involve contact between the 
jurors and state' s witnesses between the high school acquaintance 
and trials. Cobbr 775 P.2d 1123, 1126; Hewittr 689 P.2d 22, 25-26. 
In Gray, there is no indication that the juror was acquainted with 
any witness who testified against Mr. Gray or the prosecutor in the 
case; the juror had simply worked as a highway patrol trooper and 
knew the town sheriff in a case where the witnesses were apparently 
members of the police force, and not sheriff s deputies or 
troopers. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1222-23. In the instant case, the 
juror was acquainted with key witnesses for the State, whose 
testimony was directly contested by the defense case in many 
important regards. The State' s reliance on Cobb, Hewittf and Gray 
is thus misplaced. 
The State asserts that there was no inference of bias 
attaching to juror Elmer, whose step-daughter he characterized as 
a "victim of drugs" after her criminal prosecution. State's brief 
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at 21. The State cites State v. TennysonP 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 
1993), for the proposition that there is no rule requiring 
automatic disqualification of jurors related to victims of crimes 
similar to those with which the defendant stands charged. State' s 
brief at 21. 
While there is no automatic disqualification of jurors related 
to victims of similar crimes, when a juror such as juror Elmer 
indicates that his relative has been a victim of a similar crime 
this raises an inference of bias, which must be investigated by the 
trial court prior to the juror1 s service on the case, with 
questions going beyond merely asking the juror if he can be 
impartial. E.g. State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Becker is not entitled to 
a new trial as a result of the inadequate voir dire because trial 
counsel was "fully engaged" in the voir dire. State' s brief at 22-
24, citing Tennysonf 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), and State v. 
Ellifritzr 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992). 
Reference to the record demonstrates that trial counsel' s 
performance cannot be condoned on the theory that he was exercising 
legitimate trial strategy, as was exercised in Tennyson and 
Ellifritz, because trial counsel did not understand the law 
governing voir dire, which law he should have asserted on his 
client' s behalf. 
In this case, eight of the prospective jurors had 
relationships with the prosecutor and/or police officers testifying 
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against Mr. Becker, and the trial court did not ask any questions 
to assess the potential bias, other than perfunctory questions 
asking the jurors to assess their ability to serve impartially (T. 
69-79). When the trial court gave the defense the opportunity to 
ask supplemental voir dire questions, trial counsel did not inquire 
further about the jurors' relationships with the officers (T. 1070-
111). Trial counsel did not seek further voir dire of the juror 
who characterized his step-daughter as a victim of drugs as a 
result of having been prosecuted for some offense. 
This was not acceptable trial strategy because the witnesses 
were presumptively biased without further voir dire. E.g. Cox; 
WpoUey, su^ra. 
Outside the jury1 s presence when it was time to make 
challenges for cause, trial counsel stated on the record, "Also it 
goes without saying that the fact that a number of these jurors 
know one or more of these officers is not going to be grounds for 
cause because of the practicality of it. It is a small town and 
they are going to run into these people from time to time." When 
the court indicated, "Well, the fact that they know them, I don't 
think is grounds for cause any where," trial counsel stated that he 
understood. (T. 129). 
This does not reflect acceptable trial strategy. If a trial 
takes place in a small town where the jurors and witnesses are 
necessarily acquainted, the proper procedure is to conduct an 
adequate voir dire to seat a fair jury, or to change the venue if 
this is not possible. E.g. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 
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1989). All defendants are entitled to a fair trial, which is 
impossible absent an adequate voir dire, regardless of the size of 
the town in which the trial is initiated. E.g. State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 (Utah 1988) (citing Article I, 
sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed on 
other grounds, State v. Menziesf 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
Trial counsel asked the prosecutor if he knew if the jurors1 
relationships with the police went beyond mere casual recognition, 
and the trial court indicated that the prosecutor could answer if 
he knew, but that the jurors were the best sources of that 
information (T. 130). The prosecutor indicated that the police 
officers were from Levan, the court noted that some of the 
prospective jurors were from Levan, and no additional voir dire was 
requested or conducted on this topic (T. 130). 
This was not acceptable trial strategy. As the trial court 
recognized, the jurors were the sources of the information 
necessary to insure Mr. Becker' s right to a fair trial. In relying 
on the prosecutor to provide whatever information he had about 
juror-witness relationships, rather than seeking an adequate voir 
dire, trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Cf. Tennyson 
(record demonstrated reasonable performance by trial counsel) and 
Ellifritz (same). 
The State speculates that trial counsel abandoned the 
challenge for cause of juror Connor as a result of his " full 
engagement" in the voir dire process. State" s brief at 22-23. The 
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law establishes that Mr. Becker is entitled to a new trial because 
the trial court improperly denied a challenge for cause of Connor, 
who served on the jury because Mr. Becker exhausted his peremptory 
challenges on other jurors (R. 174). See Bakerf supra. 
Because three incompetent jurors actually deliberated in Mr. 
Becker' s case, through no fault of Mr. Becker' s, he is entitled to 
a new trial. See Point I of Mr. Becker's opening brief. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that Trooper Mangelson 
should have advised the occupants of the car about their Miranda 
rights prior to asking them if they had been smoking marijuana and 
telling them that the smell was as plain as day and that he knew 
they were using it, the State argues first that the occupants were 
not entitled to Miranda warnings. State' s brief at 34-38. The 
State first indicates that Mangelson' s statements are the only 
factor distinguishing the scenario in this case from an ordinary 
traffic stop, State's brief at 36-37, failing to recognize the 
significance of Mangelson' s choice to keep Mr. Becker' s driver' s 
license. See State v. Shoulderblade, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 29 
(Utah 1995) (recognizing that one is not free to leave when driver' s 
license is being held by police). Seeking to distinguish this 
case from State v. Mirquetr 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmedf 268 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), the State contends that Mangelson's 
statements were not accusatorial enough to require a Miranda 
warning beforehand. State's brief at 37. When a police officer 
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has stopped a car and does not return the passenger' s 
identification, but doggedly insists that the passengers have been 
smoking marijuana, 
this constitutes custodial interrogation which should have been 
preceded by Miranda warnings. Mirquet. 
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that Trooper Mangelson 
should not have searched any part of the car because there were no 
exigent circumstances, the State first argues that trial counsel 
did not preserve the claim of exigent circumstances. State' s brief 
at 27-28. 
The record reflects that the issue was raised adequately in 
the trial court. Mr. Means filed a motion to suppress in the trial 
court, which invoked Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
(R. 170-171). In arguing the motion to suppress, Mr. Means 
conceded that the smell of marijuana may have provided probable 
cause and a basis for a search warrant, but did not provide 
authority to search (T. 58-59). This argument was consistent with 
the law already established at the time of trial, that under the 
Utah Constitution, warrantless searches are not permitted in the 
absence of exigent circumstances. E.g. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 
460, 4700 (Utah 1990)(plurality); State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969, 
973 n.7 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 n.2 
(Utah App. 1993). 
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that this Court may 
reach the issue by way of the plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel doctrines, in the event that the Court feels that the 
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issue was not preserved below, the State argues that the brief on 
appeal is inadequate because it simply cites to Larocco. State1 s 
brief at 28. Mr. Becker's opening brief on appeal cites not only 
Larocco, but also cites to Naisbitt and Dudley, both of which cases 
recognize that Utah law already establishes the need for exigent 
circumstances, and also cites State v. Spurcreon, 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 
35 (Utah 1995), contrasting the federal law. Mr. Becker's opening 
brief at 25-26. 
Where the state constitutional principles are already established, 
citation to the controlling authorities should suffice. Cf. State 
v. Amiconer 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)(court declined to 
address issue raised in brief, absent legal analysis or authority). 
In any event, it appears that federal law now comports with 
prior Utah law, in requiring not only probable cause, but also 
exigent circumstances in order to justify searches of automobiles. 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (plurality). 
The State argues that the facts here demonstrate exigent 
circumstances, because Trooper Mangelson was a lone officer dealing 
with three evasive suspects, one of whom tried to drive away. 
State's brief at 29. It was not until the trooper completed the 
illegal search of the trunk that Mr. Becker ran away, so this event 
is not properly used to justify the search. As the record 
demonstrates, backup officers were just a radio call away from 
Trooper Mangelson, who could have detained the individuals while he 
obtained a telephone warrant. In these circumstances, there were 
no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. But 
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see State v. Anderson (plurality), supra (indicating that exigent 
circumstances existed when occupants of movable car were alerted to 
police presence, and evidence may have been lost if warrant was 
sought). 
The State makes no effort to prove that finding of the 
evidence by Trooper Mangelson was attenuated from preceding 
illegalities, given the State* s position that there were no 
preceding illegalities. State's brief at 31-32. Mr. Becker 
maintains that the trooper' s violation of his Miranda rights, the 
trooper' s performance of a warrantless search absent exigent 
circumstances, and the trooper' s coercion of the occupants of the 
car constitute illegalities fatally tainting any consent that may 
have been given to the search. See Mr. Becker' s opening brief at 
19-27. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE REQUESTED LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. 
In response to Mr. Becker' s contention that the trial court 
committed reversible error in failing to give the requested class 
A misdemeanor joyriding instruction, the State concedes that the 
charged offense and requested offense contain overlapping elements, 
and the first prong of Baker is met. State's brief at 39 n.10. 
The State contends that the second prong of Baker was not met 
because there was no rational basis for acquitting Mr. Becker of 
the charged offense and convicting him of class A misdemeanor 
joyriding. The State argues that the defense evidence indicated 
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that Mr. Becker stole no car at all, and that he is therefore not 
entitled to the lesser instruction. State's brief at 41-43.2 
Lisa LaBarrie did not maintain that Mr. Becker "absolutely did 
not get into a car but ran into an open field/ State' s brief at 
41. She testified that she could not see all of the area where 
events may have occurred, did not see Mr. Becker take the car or 
see anyone take a car, but saw Mr. Becker run into an open field 
(T. 309-310). Copies of the transcript pages containing her 
testimony are in Appendix 2. The State1 s evidence indicated that 
Mr. Becker took the car in circumstances susceptible to the 
inference that his intent was to temporarily deprive the owner of 
her car, State's brief at 40-41, and the trial court recognized 
this to some extent in giving the third degree felony lesser 
included offense instruction (T. 341). In these circumstances, the 
trial court should have given the requested class A misdemeanor 
a
 The State argues, 
The only defense witness, Lisa LaBarrie, 
maintained that defendant absolutely did not get into a 
car but ran into an open field (T. 309-10). Thus, the 
only evidence introduced by defense counsel was that 
the defendant did not steal any car at all, not that he 
intended to only temporarily deprive the owner of her 
property. 
In the absence of any evidence presented of 
defendant' s intent to temporarily deprive the owner of 
the vehicle, the trial court was correct in refusing to 
give the defendant' s proposed lesser included offense 
instruction. See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 
(Utah 1987)(manslaughter instruction properly refused 
in second-degree murder conviction where all the 
evidence the defendant presented at trial was to the 
effect that he had not caused the victim' s death. 
State's brief at 41. 
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instruction. Cf. State v. Shabataf 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984)(trial 
court properly denied requested lesser included offense 
instruction, where defense evidence and theory of the case were 
inconsistent with requested instruction). 
The State argues that any error in denying the class A 
instruction was harmless because the jury rejected the option of 
convicting Mr. Becker of the third degree felony lesser included 
offense. State's brief at 43-44. 
The trial court1 s failure to give the requested class A 
misdemeanor lesser included offense instruction was not harmless 
because the lesser included offense instruction given by the court 
was inconsistent with all evidence presented at trial. The court 
gave the jury an instruction on third degree felony joyriding, 
which stated, 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, 
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you my find the 
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle for an Extended 
Period of Time, a Third Degree Felony, if you find the 
following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
-And did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or 
lawful custodian 
-within 24 hours of the exercise of unlawful control. 
(R. 212). The jury's decision to reject this option may well be 
based on the fact that the car was recovered the same day that Mr. 
Becker took the car, or on the basis that it was not Mr. Becker who 
returned the car. 
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On the evidence presented, the more appropriate instruction 
was the one refused by the trial court# which stated, 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, 
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the 
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class 'A" 
misdemeanor, if you find the following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
-not his own; 
-without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian; 
-with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or 
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle. 
(R. 120). 
Because the class A misdemeanor instruction met both prongs of 
the Baker test, and the trial court committed reversible error in 
failing to give it. Icl. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF 
THE PAPER BAG. 
In addressing Mr. Becker' s claim that he is entitled to a new trial 
by virtue of the trial court* s ruling that Trooper Mangelson could 
testify that the bag that Mr. Becker ran away with contained an 
illegal drug, the State argues that this Court should not address 
the claim because Mr. Becker did not provide the Court with a 
transcript of the trial court' s initial hearing of hearing wherein 
Mr. Becker' s motion to exclude this evidence was initially argued. 
State's brief at 44-45, citing State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 228 
(Utah 1992); and State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 437 (Utah 1983). 
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Menzies and Taylor do not support the State1 s assertion that uwhere 
defendant fails to provide[] an adequate record for review, the 
appellate court is precluded from considering the matter on 
appeal/ State' s brief at 44-45. In Menzies, the court found that 
errors in the transcripts were not sufficiently serious to defeat 
the defendant" s right to appellate review, and in Taylor, the court 
determined that omissions in the transcript were so serious that 
the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Those cases are thus 
inapposite. 
There are cases which require the appellant to provide a 
sufficient record to permit meaningful appellate review. E.g. 
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985). In the case before the 
Court, the record contains a copy of the motion in limine (R. 126-
127), the transcript containing trial counsel' s argument in support 
of the motion in limine (T. 24-25), the prosecutor's argument in 
response (T. 25), and the trial court's rulings (T. 25; R. 162). 
Appellate review on the merits is therefore appropriate. 
On the merits of the issue, the State contends that the 
contents of the bag were relevant and not prejudicial, to establish 
the identity of the evidence to support the tampering with evidence 
charge. State's brief at 46-47.3 In this argument, the State 
proceeds as though proof of relevance of evidence concomitantly 
proves a lack of prejudice. State' s brief at 46-47. 
3
 This justification for the admission of the evidence 
differs from the State' s position in the trial court, where the 
prosecutor argued that he needed to submit evidence concerning 
the contents of the bag in order to justify the continuing 
investigation (T. 25). 
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It is not proper to obviate the prejudice analysis under rule 
403 simply because evidence may be relevant under rule 401. See 
Mr. Becker1 s opening brief at 33-35. 
Under the evidence tampering statute/ to prove evidence 
tampering, the only evidence that the State needed to identify was 
the brown paper bag that Mr. Becker allegedly took. The contents 
of the bag did not make any fact in issue more or less probable, 
and the contents were thus irrelevant under rule 401. 
The State argues that any potential error in the admission of 
the evidence was harmless. State1 s brief at 47-48. 
The evidence supporting and contesting the tampering with the 
evidence charge was for the jury to evaluate. The possibility that 
their deliberations were swayed by the improper admission of 
Trooper Mangelson' s speculation that the bag contained 
methamphetamine or crack cocaine is very real, and heightened by 
the prosecutor' s closing argument that the jury should convict Mr. 
Becker because he had already "beat the system" by running away 
with the drugs and avoiding a more serious prosecution (T. 353-54). 
4
 Tampering with evidence is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-8-510 as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
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Because the evidence was improperly admitted and there stands 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence 
of such error, this Court should grant Mr. Becker a new trial. See 
Point IV of Mr. Becker' s opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Becker requests a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, improper evidence is excluded, and the jury is instructed 
properly. 
Respectfully submitted this %? day of HUnK. 1996. 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEYl ff 
Attorney for Mr. Becker 
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foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY V 
Attorney for Mr: Becker 
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Appendix 1 
MR. BART WANKIER: No. 
THE COURT: You recognize them and do speak 
with them when you see them? 
MR. BART WANKIER: Yes sir, 
THE COURT: But outside of the speaking acquaintance 
you have no other socialization with them is that correct? 
MR. BART WANKIER: No sir. 
THE COURT: As a result of that acquaintance 
with these officers, would you be prejudicial for or against 
either party in this case? 
MR. BART WANKIER: No sir. 
THE COURT: And could you set that acquaintance 
aside and fairly and impartially decide this case solely 
on the evidence presented in this courtroom? 
MR. BART WANKIER: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: Anyone else acquainted with Mr. Eyre 
or his witnesses, Mr. Newell. 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: What is the nature of your acquaintance 
and with whom? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: I have been the High School 
Pri nci pal . 
THE COURT: To all of them? 
MR. CLARK NEWELL: And a member of the community 









1 on the S h e r i f f ' s Department and I can ' t remember the ir 
2 names now. 
3 THE COURT: Well, being their High School 
4 Principal, did that prejudice you in any fashion against 
5 any of them? 
6 1 MR. CLARK NEWELL: Well, I had a pretty good regarjd 
7 for them, beyond that I don't think so. 
8 1 THE COURT: Didn't give you a lot of trouble? 
9 I MR. CLARK NEWELL: Not especially no. 
10 THE COURT: As a result of your acquaintance 
11 with the police officers and with Mr. Eyre, would 
12 you be prejudice for or against either party in this 
13 case? 
14 MR. CLARK NEWELL: I don't think so. 
15 THE COURT: And you could set aside that acquaintance 
16 1 and fairly and impartailly try this case based on the 
17 evidence that has come forth in this courtroom ? 
18 MR CLARK NEWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Let's go to the 
row behind the bar. Is anyone there acquainted with Mr. 
Eyre or any of the witnesses Mr. Reed. 
MR. MERRILL REED: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: What is the nature of your acqua i ntanc|( 
and with whom? 
MR. MERRILL REED: Mr. Eyre represented me in < 
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Appendix 2 
us and was telling Michael to come here. 
Q So you say that he reholstered the gun when he 
searches the trunk and now he takes the gun out again? 
A After he searched the trunk and told me to *a1k to 
Rolando and Michael he had the gun to my back. He was 
behind me. 
Q This officer is a large man isn't he? 
A Yes, he is. 
Q And would he have any reason to fear of the 
three of you? 
A Since he assumed that we were gang members maybe tha 
is why. 
Q Did he ever pat you down for weapons? 
A No, he didn't. 
Q So after he asks Michael to approach him and he has 
got his gun drawn, at that point and time, Rolando 
takes off running? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know why he ran? 
A I believe because he was scared like all of us. 
Q What were you scared of? 
A I was scared of the officer. 
Q This is not an isolated area is it? There are 
cars going by many? 



























Q You were by a very large commercial area were you not] 
A No , i t wasn't l a r g e , there was a gas stat ion and a 
hotel . 
Q Wasn't there three gas stations, two restaurants, 
two motels, two other businesses? 
A At the time I don't believe so. I saw a gas station 
and I saw a hotel . 
Q Did you see a Burger King. 
A You know they were doing construction. 
Q Did you see a Burger King? 
A No, I saw a gas station and a hotel. 
Q So you weren't very observant were you? 
A No, I wasn't. 
Q And where did you see Rolando run to? 
A Down the hill. 
Q What did he do after he got to the bottom of the 
hill? 
A He ran through the gas station and across the street 
and into an open field. 
Q Did he cross any fences? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q How many? 
A About three maybe . 
Q And he ran through the gas station area? 
A Yes. 
